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This study provides a theoretical explanation, first, as to why some less-developed countries 
(LDCs) have complained about the OECD negotiations of a multilateral investment 
agreement (MAI) in 1998 although they were free to join or opt out. Second, it explains why 
we observe instead an explosion of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The explanation rests 
on an FDI model with three distortions: there is a time-inconsistency problem of extracting 
rents from FDI, there is an underprovision of public goods in LDCs, and there is a lobbying 
distortion in political decision making that is initially unobservable to foreign investors which 
causes political risk. The negotiation of MAI by a club exerts a negative information 
externality on non-members. A regime of BITs undermines the club agreement and unravels 
the information-asymmetry problem. However, an appropriately designed MAI is world-
welfare superior compared to a regime of BITs by alleviating the lobbying distortion. 
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An important part of globalization is the activity of multinational enterprises (MNEs).
The explosion of such activity in recent years had an impact not only on the eﬃciency of
world wide production sharing but also on relative factor incomes. The resulting conﬂict
of interest across owners of diﬀerent factors may stimulate policy reactions to globalization
both on a national and an international level where some governments favor liberalization
and others regulation of foreign direct investment (FDI).
In fact, there was a trial to implement a multilateral agreement of investment
(MAI) to liberalize FDI. In the year 1995, negotiations for a MAI were initiated by the
OECD among experts and a draft proposal emerged. When the draft became known to
the public, it received criticism by several interest and opinion groups within advanced
countries (NGOs, trade unions) and a ﬁerce opposition by some developing countries.
Eventually, this agreement failed on an OECD summit in 1998, but there was at the same
time a surprising explosion in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) throughout the 90ies.
The purpose of this study is ﬁrst to explain, why some less developed countries
(LDCs) have complained about the OECD negotiations although they were free to join or
opt out. Second, why do we observe instead an explosion of BITs? And ﬁnally, is there
a role for a multilateral investment agreement to improve world welfare if appropriately
designed?
I answer these questions in a model, where FDI is driven by relative factor endow-
ments and political risk. Political risk arises from change in government and incomplete
information of MNEs on the new governments’ attitude towards FDI before experiencing
the new policy. Because MNEs base their location decision in this stage on some average
perception, they loose from businesses in illiberal countries but gain from those in liberal
ones. Hence, resources are transferred indirectly from countries that are liberal towards
FDI to those that are not. This creates the incentive for liberal countries to create a mul-
tilateral investment agreement that enforces a minimum standard of FDI liberalization.
Since all countries in the world are free to join or opt out, their membership choice reveals
information on their type and reduces the indirect subsidy by causing investment diversion
2towards members.
While this can explain the protest of some outsiders to the negotiation, it also
explains why the agreement is unstable, because the same conﬂict of interest applies
among negotiating countries. Hence, a regime will emerge where many agreements are
formed at diﬀerent degrees of FDI liberalization taking into account diﬀerences among
countries in their FDI-related policy goals. One may view this regime as one of BITs. Still,
there is some potential for a multilateral agreement to improve world welfare compared
to a regime of BITs. An appropriately designed multilateral agreement bends policies
of a self-interested government towards the one that optimizes host-country welfare even
if countries are not members, because the threat of investment diversion disciplines the
government when acting in its own interest.
My conclusions are limited in two respects. When explaining the failure of MAI
in 1998, the protest of LDCs was not the only reason - and maybe not the decisive one.
There was considerable disagreement among the OECD countries for a number of reasons,
as well. I disregard these considerations and focus on the LDC stake in MAI negotiations.1
Moreover, I show the emergence of a BIT regime. However, this model is not thought to
be a comprehensive explanation for why many diﬀerent investment treaties emerge rather
than an explanation for why one multilateral treaty does not sustain.
There are few studies on multilateral investment agreements. Markusen (2001) dis-
cusses the LDC decision to accede a MAI. Commitment enhances credibility that promotes
FDI. Instead, the loss of discretion when implementing MAI rules can remove a threat of
host countries against MNEs and worsen its bargaining position in MNE rent sharing.
Turrini and Urban (2001) take up the argument that MAI membership results in a loss
of bargaining power of LDCs vis a vis MNEs. The beneﬁt from MAI membership results,
however, from signalling by accession to MAI a liberal FDI policy and thereby attracting
additional investment. In addition, the endogenous membership choice gives rise to mul-
tiple equilibria where either all countries join, no MAI is formed, or some countries form a
MAI. It is shown that countries which stay outside of MAI actually loose from the forma-
tion of a liberal investment club relative to a world without MAI, because FDI is diverted
1See Hoekman and Saggi (2000), p. 184ﬀ, for a comprehensive list of reasons.
3from them towards the club.2 Che and Willmann (2006) focus on the dispute settlement
procedure of MAI to generate a self-enforcing contract. MAI veriﬁes any expropriation of
MNE assets by a member country and triggers a coordinated withdrawal of capital by all
MNEs. As a consequence, MAI can self-enforce more proﬁtable capital ﬂows relative to a
world without MAI. The drawback is that the world interest rate rises which hurts poor
countries the most.
I deviate from the previous studies by endogenizing the choice of partners with
whom to form agreements and the choice of strictness of the agreement. With these
extensions, I can explain why MAI negotiation failed and resulted into a scattered system
of BITs. Moreover, I give a political economy microfoundation to Turrini and Urban
(2001) of what determines the choice of MNE rent extraction by host countries. Contrary
to Che and Willmann (2006), enforcement is exogenous and the focus is on explaining the
implications of the most-favored-nation and non-discrimination principle rather than of
the dispute settlement procedure (DSP).3
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In the next section, I introduce a
baseline model of FDI, add a political equilibrium, discuss the implications of a multi-
lateral agreement for the equilibrium, and eventually characterize the equilibrium for an
exogenous MAI rule. In section 3, I endogenize the formation of negotiation groups and
show how a MAI of a given negotiation group collapses and a regime of BITs assembles.
In section 4, I suggest a MAI design that is world-welfare superior and causes only modest
resistance by governments. A discussion of the model robustness is followed in section 5,
and a conclusion is found in section 6.
2Our paper is also somewhat related to a theory of regional trade and investment agreements by
Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel (1997). However, FDI is considered the movement of physical capital rather
than the exertion of control rights across borders, and no discussion is devoted to multilateral agreements,
how they form, whether they are stable, and whether they yield additional welfare gains.
3There is also an informal discussion on MAI by Hoekman and Saggi (2000), and Ferrarini (2003).
Hoekman and Saggi (2000) see in MAI an instrument of FDI promotion that constrains countries’ control
over MNEs. When joining MAI, governments forgo the possibility to shift rents from MNEs to host
countries in exchange for using MAI as a commitment device or signal to enhance credibility of an FDI
promotion policy. In addition, FDI inﬂuences the factor income distribution and aﬀects thereby the
political equilibrium in the host country. Ferrarini (2003) extends the discussion from the OECD MAI
draft to a comprehensive list of investment measures in the multilateral organization of the world economy.
42M o d e l S e t - u p
In broad terms, I describe a multi-country economy of potential host countries to Northern
FDI with endogenous government policy. To be more precise, there is a mass one of host
countries indexed by i. I abstract from Northern home countries to FDI, since I am
interested in the LDC stake in MAI. To keep the model tractable, I set up the model such
that each host country can be analyzed in isolation, since each country acts like a small
open economy. This is consistent with a single country having measure zero mass in world
income and no inﬂuence on world prices.
Id e ﬁne multinational enterprises (MNEs) as ﬁrms for which the nationality of cor-
porate control is diﬀerent from the nationality of the plant location. Typically, diﬀerences
in control involve diﬀerences in technology both with respect to total factor productiv-
ity and factor intensities. FDI ﬂows are then ﬂows of technology that result from MNE
location decisions.4
FDI inﬂows are driven by two factors: political risk and factor cost. I capture two
stylized facts with these two driving forces. The ﬁrst is the Lucas puzzle, i.e. why capital
does not ﬂow from rich to poor countries.5 And the second is the observation that some
LDCs such as Mexico, Eastern Europe, China, India, etc., have actually achieved such an
inﬂux of foreign capital and managed to trigger a catch-up process. Low factor cost ensure
the attractiveness of LDCs for FDI, but FDI inﬂows are undesired by the government in
some political equilibria despite its welfare beneﬁts to the host country. In such a case
governments impose expropriation risk on MNEs and thereby expel FDI. The FDI model
is described in more detail in section 2.1.
I assume that factor intensities of MNEs and local ﬁrms do not coincide and factor
price equalization does not hold. Hence, FDI inﬂows change the distribution of factor
income. If there is no mechanism in the political system such that winners automatically
4An alternative view is to consider FDI as ﬂow of physical capital. Che and Willmann (2006) adopt
the alternative view in their analysis of MAI. Empirically, the activity of MNEs and capital ﬂows are
positively but far from perfectly correlated. Braconier et al. (2005) describes the correlation in their
sample of bilateral FDI around the world.
5Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) has recently argued contrary to Lucas (1990) that political risk is the core
cause of the lack of capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries.
5compensate losers of FDI inﬂows, then groups of diﬀerent factor owners will have conﬂict-
ing interests in attracting or inhibiting FDI. The outcome of the resulting political struggle
will shape government decisions on national policies and at a multilateral negotiation. At
the same time, the political decision maker has a national policy instrument - the rent
extraction through taxation, expropriation, bribery, and many other informal measures
that aﬀect FDI proﬁts - to steer the amount of FDI inﬂows compatible with the political
equilibrium of the host country. I denote this rent extraction rate by β.
Yet, political equilibria are unstable, and governments change either as the result
of an election outcome in a democracy or a coup d’etat in an authoritarian regime. New
governments encompass a new composition of power among social groups which changes
at the same time the government preference of how liberal or illiberal it is towards FDI.
The degree of liberality is captured by a preference parameter χ w h i c hi sa s s u m e dt ob ea
uniformly distributed random variable on the range [0,
_
χ]. I will show in section 2.2 that
the preference for liberality, χ, is one determinant of the rent extraction rate, β.
However, investors learn the type of the new government mostly at a time lag by
own experience and the one of their competitors. Even if they learn the type immediately,
it will take time to adjust their investments. To capture this idea, I assume that MNEs
are caught by surprise by a new government policy β in a ﬁrst period, t =1 , but can
re-locate after revelation of the government policy in a second period, t =2 .T h e r e a f t e r
a new policy struggle begins and a new government comes into place. However, I assume
that there is no way that one government can borrow reputation to the next one. Hence,
it is suﬃcient to analyse a game over the two periods of any one legacy alone. Both the
timing of the policy action, β, and the restriction of the game to two periods establish a
time-inconsistency problem. Since the new government knows that MNEs cannot react
immediately on a change in policy, they are tempted to extract too much rents from MNEs
which protect themselves by reducing their activities. Apart from the time-inconsistency
problem, political risk involves also an asymmetric information problem, because MNEs
do not know in the ﬁrst period the government preferences, χ.6
6There exists an ample literature on a theory of expropriation risk of MNEs. Most of the time it is
regarded as some sort of a time inconsistency problem between investor and governments. In this tradition
6Government 
decides to join 
MAI or stay out 
MNEs to locate 
in t=1
Governments 
decide on rent 
extraction rate ß
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re-locate in t=2
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Figure 1: Sequencing of events in section 2
Finally, I think of a MAI membership decision as a credible commitment device to
adhere to some given rules which are explained later in section 2.3. Hence, the accession
decision, Z, to join MAI, I,o rt oo p to u t ,O, will take place in the beginning of the game.7
I can summarize the previous discussion by displaying the resulting timing of the game in
Figure 1.
2.1 Modelling FDI
The only purpose of the FDI model is to obtain a relation between FDI inﬂows and relative
factor prices. My results on explaining the protest against MAI by some LDCs and the
failure of MAI do not depend on which factor actually gains from FDI inﬂows. A vertical
FDI model of Helpman (1984) would produce such a result, but turns out to be too
complex to be integrated into my MAI game. Instead, I resort to a drastic simpliﬁcation
and refrain from many features of MNE models. For example, I deﬁne MNEs as one-plant
ﬁrms with foreign ownershipr a t h e rt h a nm u l t i p l a n tﬁrms. Other features of MNEs are
kept. For example, MNEs are exclusive owners of a superior technology to produce a
particular good. Moreover, MNEs are free to choose their location among many countries.
Finally, MNEs operate with scale economies.
Each country, i, is endowed with some units of labor Li and capital Ki.It h i n ko f
can be found Eaton and Gersovitz (1984), Raﬀ (1992), Doyle and van Wijnbergen (1994), Thomas and
Worall (1994), Schnitzer (1999) and Janeba (2002), among others.
7The negotiation of MAI is further endogenized in section 3 when the strictness of the MAI rule is
bargained over and the group of negotiating countries is endogenously formed.
7capital as internationally immobile factor such as human capital, land, or natural resources.
An MNE operates with constant marginal cost. There are A units of labor necessary to
produce one additional unit of output, A<1. To start operation, overhead cost have
to be born. For simplicity, one unit of a Cobb-Douglas composite of capital and labor is
necessary, i.e. 1=k0.5l0.5,w h e r ek and l are the plant-headquarter demand of an MNE of
capital and labor in a host country, respectively. I assume that all MNEs are symmetric
and do not require therefore a ﬁrm index. The capital share is set to 0.5 only to obtain
smooth analytical closed form solutions. However, my results will not depend qualitatively
on this choice.
Local ﬁrms do not have access to modern technology. I assume as in Murphy et al.
(1989) that local ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms owned by nationals, employ a traditional CRS technology,
where one unit of labor is transformed into one unit of output. Such a (handicraft)
technology is available to anyone in all product markets without market entry or exit
barriers.
Consumers are split into workers and capital owners. Only workers demand MNE
products. Otherwise, consumers are in all countries identical. There is a unit mass of prod-
ucts, of which an endogenous fraction is supplied by MNEs. For the sake of concreteness,





with the consumption of good j by consumers in country i at time t, cit(j). The utility
function of capital owners is analogous but covers only goods that are tailor-made rather
than MNE mass-fabrics. For simplicity, I abstract from time preference.
Trade cost are absent. Factors are intersectorally, but not internationally mobile.
Wages are chosen to be the numeraire (in one country). I assume that there is no com-
plete specialization. Hence, product prices in sectors without MNEs will be one due to
international trade and wages will be one in all countries due to perfect competition on
the labor market. Product prices in sectors with MNEs will also be (marginally below)
one, because MNEs will employ a limit pricing strategy. If they chose a price larger than
8one, local ﬁrms would enter and the MNE would forgo strictly positive proﬁts. Since the
monopoly price is larger than one, the MNE would also give up on proﬁt opportunities if
the product price was set strictly below one. As a result, whenever an MNE exists in a
product market, it will serve the entire market. Local ﬁrms will only be present in markets
where no MNE exists.
Turning to optimal MNE choices, the relative factor demand will obey litZ =
ritZkitZ, where ritZ is the rental rate of country i at time period t.M o r e o v e r , t h e i n -
dex Z, Z ∈ {N,I,O}, indicates whether I consider a world without a MAI (N), or a
country in a world with MAI that opts out of MAI (O) ,o rac o u n t r yi naw o r l dw i t hM A I
that opts in (I). Capital market clearing requires φitZ · kitZ = Ki, where φitZ is the mass
of sectors with MNE ﬁrms in country i - called FDI inﬂows for short.
The equilibrium rental rate, ritZ, is found to be from relative factor demand, capital






Hence, FDI inﬂows exert upward pressure on rental rates. While this is not directly obvious
from vertical FDI theory, it corresponds with empirical stylized facts. Quite important for
the perception of politicians that negotiated the MAI in the late 90ies was the experience
of Ireland in the early 90ies. This country was able to trigger a spectacular catch-up by an
FDI promotion strategy including a generous tax break on MNE proﬁts repatriated from
Ireland. Barry and Bradley (1996) report that inward FDI was both human-capital and
physical-capital intensive. At the same time, relative high-skilled wages and real-estate
rental rates rose sharply with incoming FDI ﬂows in line with my model. Similar relative
factor price changes are found in Feenstra and Hanson (1997) for Mexico, after NAFTA
was founded. NAFTA contained FDI provisions quite similar to the ones in the MAI
draft.8
Turning to the location decision of MNEs, I assume that there is free entry and
exit and risk neutrality of MNEs. Then, there is entry of MNEs in host countries until
8Markusen (2002), p. 133, assumes also in his knowledge-capital model that all MNE activities are
more high-skill intensive than the local economy consistent with my model.
9expected proﬁts are zero.9 In period 2, the rent-extraction rate is known and the zero-proﬁt
condition is given by:
li2Z + ri2Z · ki2Z =[ 1− βiZ](1− A)Y, (2)
where I recall that price and wage are one, (1 − A) is the operating-proﬁtm a r k - u p ,Y
demand for one MNE good, and βiZ incorporates a rate of rent extraction of countries
from MNE operating proﬁts that is time-invariant in accordance with Figure 1.10 It h i n k
of rent extraction as all kind of policy measures that are intended to reduce MNE proﬁts.
These may be both direct measures like taxation, ﬁnes, or expropriation, and indirect
measures like the requirement to engage in joint ventures with local partners, relaxation
of intellectual property right protection, or bribery. Rent extraction generates (some) gov-
ernment revenue which is spent on public goods that are produced by the CRS technology
in sectors without MNEs. Still in period 2, the zero proﬁt condition (2) implies together
with (1), the relative factor demand, and the capital market clearing condition:
φi2Z =0 .5Ki [1 − βiZ]Y ≡ φ(βiZ). (3)
FDI inﬂows depend on two country-speciﬁc factors - the capital endowment of a country
Ki and the rent extraction rate βiZ. Solving for the rental rate in period 2 ﬁnally from
(1)-(3) yields:
ri2Z =0 .25(1 − βiZ)
2 Y
2 ≡ r(βiZ). (4)
Since FDI inﬂows increase the capital rewards and the government can steer by choice of
the FDI regime the FDI inﬂows, the degree of FDI liberalization appears as an indirect
policy instrument to redistribute factor incomes within a country.
In period 1, the ﬁrm does not know the rent extraction rate βiZ.I naw o r l dw i t h o u t
9I allow for a mixed strategy in the location decision. By the law of large numbers, the probability of
one MNE to locate in country i during period t is equal to the mass of MNEs, φit,l o c a t i n gt h e r e .
10It would be easy to add a Northern headquarter ﬁxed cost to render our deﬁnition of a vertical FDI
ﬁrm comparable to Helpman (1984). It would obviously remain inconsequential for the model as long as
this cost is constant.
10MAI, a risk neutral ﬁrm simply forms the unconditional expected value on it which I denote
in slight misuse of standard notation by E [βiN |N]. I n s t e a d ,i naw o r l dw i t hM A I ,t h e
ﬁrm exploits the information on the MAI membership decision M ∈ {I,O} in forming a
conditional expectation on βiM denoted by E [βiM |M]. Since the zero-proﬁtc o n d i t i o n( 2 )
is linear in its random variable, equations (2)-(4) hold analogously by replacing βiZ with
its corresponding conditional expected value.
To close the model, I assume for simplicity that world demand for MNE goods
stems only from workers. Workers symmetrically distribute their income towards a mass
one of products (since all prices are one), whereof a fraction ΦtZ, which is equal to the
aggregate of φitZ over all countries, is produced by MNEs. Hence, world demand that falls
onto supply of any one MNE is just Y =
R
Lidi, where I recall that wages, prices, and
the total mass of goods are all one. This assumption serves to sharpen my results and
to render analysis tractable. There won’t be wrong conclusions drawn from my model as
long as there is not expected a major increase of world income through the creation of
MAI. This is plausible, since MNEs make up only a small part of economic activity even
in highly developed countries.11 It is further assumed that ΦtZ < 1 in equilibrium.12
11A related argument has been used in Krugman (2000) showing that international trade of the North-
South type makes up an almost negligible part of OECD GDP. This is even more so true for North-South
FDI despite its growth. Exact numbers are hard to come by, but the following ﬁgure may give an idea of
the magnitude of FDI activity. There are a mere 2.7 million employees of US aﬃliates in emerging market
economies and LDCs in 1996 (UNCTAD, 1999, p. 450), which is quite small compared to the US labor
force.















The ﬁrst term is total world labor supply of which is deducted the labor employed in MNE production,
i.e. labor coeﬃcient, A,t i m e st h es h a r eo fM N E s ,ΦtZ, times output of one MNE, Y =
R
Lidi. From total
world labor supply is also deducted the labor demand for MNE plant- headquarter services, which must
be equal to ﬁxed labor cost divided by the wage which is one. However, ﬁxed labor cost of all MNEs is
given by total ﬁxed cost which must be equal to operating proﬁts,
¡R







all MNEs according to the zero-proﬁt condition, times the labor share in ﬁxed cost, 0.5, which is derived
from the Cobb-Douglas production function with factor cost share 0.5.
Instead, the world demand for CRS goods is given by demand of workers, i.e. income share on CRS
goods, (1 − ΦtZ), times income from labor,
R
Lidi, plus demand of capital owners, i.e. income share
one times capital income 0.5
¡R






, which in turn is derived analogue to the









the expression for government revenue. It is straightforward to show, that demand and supply indeed
equate each other. Exports of CRS goods of each country are obtained from subtracting CRS demand of
any country from its supply for a given φitZ. Clearly, countries with a large share in φitZ export MNE
11In the next section, I discuss what may determine the political equilibrium of factor
income redistribution.
2.2 Modelling the political equilibrium
The rent extraction rate βiZ is determined by governments. I assume that a government
of a country maximizes a country welfare term that is biased towards some interest group.
Grossman and Helpman (1994) consider a lobbying model where speciﬁc-factor owners pay
campaign contributions to the government to convince her to shape government policy in
the lobby-groups’ interest. I assume that capital owners are lobbying for policies that
increase rental rates which is consistent with the observation that LDCs tend to have an
income distribution that is more unequal than in developed countries. Taking rich people
as capital owners, lobbying by capital owners will produce a larger relative rental-wage
rate. I will discuss this assumption further in section 5.2. Such a set up can be written in
reduced form as a maximization problem of the following government objective function
WiZ(χ,βiZ) with respect to the rent extraction rate βiZ (see Grossman and Helpman,
1996, and Ethier, 1998)13:
WiZ(χ,βiZ)=2 L + χri1ZKi + χr(βiZ)Ki (5)
+uβiZYφ i1Z + uβiZYφ(βiZ).
The government objective function depends on factor incomes and on tax revenue in both
periods.14 Importantly, factor income of a country rises with inﬂo w so fF D I .T h i sp r o v i d e s
an incentive to liberalize FDI.15
products and import CRS products and vice versa. Finally, labor market clearing follows from Walras’
law.
13A study that applies a lobbying framework on policy determinants of factor prices to a small open
economy with internationally mobile factors is Facchini and Willmann (2005). Grossman and Helpman
(1996) analyzes trade protection in a lobbying model in the presence of MNEs.
14We ignore discounting for simplicity.
15This result is in contrast to Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977) which shows that capital inﬂows
may reduce host country welfare in the presence of a small tariﬀ.T h e d i ﬀerence in eﬀects arises from
the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of FDI. While Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977) considers FDI as an inﬂow of
physical capital, I consider FDI as an inﬂow of technology that rises the demand for capital rather than
12Since ﬁrms locate ﬁrst, then governments choose rent extraction, and ﬁnally ﬁrms
re-locate, there arises a time inconsistency problem. Because MNEs cannot evade higher
rent extraction in the ﬁrst period, this will create an upward bias in rent extraction when
compared to the welfare-optimal one. This time inconsistency problem is standard in
modelling political risk.16 Less standard is the lobbying term χ, χ ≥ 1, that increases
the weight of capital income in the government objective function and will bias the rent
extraction rate downward. Strictly speaking, the time inconsistency problem does not
involve risk, since the optimal government behavior can be foreseen. I introduce political
risk by assuming that MNEs have incomplete knowledge on the lobbying term χ which is
assumed to be a random variable. To simplify the analysis, I assume that χ is uniformly
d i s t r i b u t e do nt h ei n t e r v a l[1,
_
χ],w h e r e
_
χ is some upper bound such that 1 < 2u<
_
χ<
∞.17 I distinguish in my notation the random variable χ from its realization of country i,
χi. Political risk arises thus from the unpredictability of government change when there
are diﬀerent types which are more or less favorable to FDI liberalization. If χ =1 , then
equation (5) represents country welfare.
While it is widely acknowledged that there are host country beneﬁts from FDI,
LDCs claim, however, control over foreign investors. For example, Ganesan, a former
Indian commerce secretary to the government, points out that it " ... becomes neces-
sary for developing countries to employ an appropriate mix of incentives and performance
requirements for FDI to achieve speciﬁc developmental objectives." (Ganesan, 1998, p. 5)
To build into the model a speciﬁc LDC development objective with respect to FDI,
I allow for an underprovision of public goods that is typical for many developing countries.
Such an underprovision may arise from the lack of an eﬃcient tax authority, for example,
in countries with corrupt bureaucracies. Moreover, there are scale economies of control
its supply. My result can easily be shown to generalize to general functional forms and diﬀerent sector
settings. It does not hinge on ﬁxing the wage at one.
16Janeba (2002) has pointed out that there must be a mutual time inconsistency problem. Countries
cannot commit to certain policies and ﬁrms cannot commit to stay in a country. Otherwise, an upfront
subsidy would solve the time inconsistency problem and no international agreement was necessary. An
upfront subsidy will not be an equilibrium, if a ﬁrm cannot commit to invest after receiving the subsidy.
I exclude an upfront-subsidy solution to the time-inconsistency problem exogenously.
17The second inequality serves only to avoid cumbersome notation but does not substantially aﬀect
results.
13to avoid tax evasions. Small local ﬁr m sm a yn o tb et a x e db e c a u s eﬁxed control cost are
larger than the tax revenue from a ﬁrm if production is small.18 For these reasons, an LDC
government may have a budget constraint on public goods such that marginal utility of
public goods is larger than of private goods (u>1). For simplicity, I assume the marginal
utility of public goods to be a constant mark-up over private marginal utility.
The optimal choice of the rent extraction rate in a world without MAI, βiN, is



































and χNu ≡ u(2 − E [βiN |N]). There is a simple interpretation of equation (7). Without
any distortions, the country-welfare optimum is zero rent extraction, since factor allocation
is eﬃcient. If there is a larger marginal utility of public than of private goods, then a
country is willing to accept lower factor incomes in exchange for a larger government
revenue and better public good provision. Hence, some strictly positive rent extraction is
optimal. Indeed, the optimal value to country-welfare optimization is (u−1)/(2u−1) ≥ 0.
Its deviation from the term [u − χ]/[2u − χ] in equation (7) represents the distortion
through lobbying. Since the capital lobbyists favor lower rent extraction to promote FDI
and push up rental rates, the second distortion is negative. The third term on the right-
18See Burgess and Stern (1993) for this reasoning, p. 775 and p. 799.
19Consistent with my argument on a lack of government ﬁnancing through local taxes, I assume that
MNE subsidies are not feasible.
14hand side is positive and represents the time-inconsistency distortion of βiN from the
optimum of the government. Interestingly, the optimal rent extraction rate depends only
on the country characteristic χ but not on endowment diﬀerences. The following Lemma
characterizes the equation (7) further.
Lemma 1 The function β (χ,E [βiN |N]) is strictly monotonically decreasing in χ on the
range 1 ≤ χ<χ Nu;a n di th o l d s0 ≤ βiN < 1 for all countries i.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
I will need these properties of βiN to analyze further optimal ﬁrm behavior and the
MAI entry choice of countries.
2.3 Modelling MAI
Before I continue the analysis, I deﬁne MAI. There are many provisions in the negotiated
MAI agreement in the various versions from 1995 to 1998.20 However, economically rel-
evant seems to be how the various provisions restrict the action space of governments to
extract rents from MNEs.21 In particular, provisions like the most-favored-nation clause
and the national-treatment clause reduce incentives of governments to extract rents, since
agents with the weakest political support (i.e. foreigners without votes in national par-
liaments) are protected by those with the strongest (i.e. national ﬁrms or foreign ﬁrms
supported by powerful governments). Moreover, there were provisions in the proposal that
guaranteed liberalization of FDI in a broad sense.
For the sake of concreteness, I assume that MAI members agree on a common
standard of maximum rent extraction B such that
βiI ≤ B. (8)
Such an asymmetric rule that constrains some countries but not others is a likely outcome
if an exclusive club negotiates it and is bound to agree unanimously among club members.
20The reference to the MAI draft is OECD (1998).
21A similar formalization of FDI provisions in NAFTA is found in Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel (1997).
15In fact, it is easiest to agree unanimously to a rule that constrains only countries that do
not participate in the negotiation. There may still be a beneﬁt to the negotiators from
this rule if the MAI causes a positive externality to the negotiators (through investment
diversion).
I assume that such a rule is self-enforcing without providing a formal argument.
Self-enforcement may follow from the DSP that was part of the MAI provisions and may
a c ti nas i m i l a rw a ya st h eo n ef o rt h eW T O . 22 Alternatively, the self-enforcement may arise
from combined trade and investment accords. See Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel (1997) for
a regional trade and investment agreement in a three-country world where a North-South
agreement is self-enforcing, because the South punishes by taxing FDI and the North
punishes by levying a tariﬀ on imports in a model with outsourcing.
In practice, the MAI draft of 1998 included an even stronger mechanism that ensures
enforceability. The MAI was planned to become legally binding by incorporating it into
national law and opening the doors of national courts to MNEs to sue governments for
their policies and regulatory takings that conﬂict with the MAI provisions.23
2.4 Deﬁning equilibrium of subgame with exogenous MAI rule
Ia mn o wr e a d yt od e ﬁne a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the stages over MAI membership
choice, optimal rent extraction by governments, and ﬁrm location in both periods. Such
an equilibrium will be given if (i) MNEs enter or exit a country with a probability φi2Z
until the zero-expected-proﬁt condition holds conditional on knowing the government type
χ and its MAI choice, Z, in period 2; (ii) governments maximize their objective function
conditional on their membership choice, Z, and on expectation formation of MNEs; (iii)
MNEs apply Bayes’ rule in forming beliefs on the government type whenever possible; (iv)
MNEs enter or exit a country with probability φi1Z until the zero-expected-proﬁtc o n d i t i o n
holds in period 1 based on their beliefs on government types and the observed MAI choice,
Z; (v) governments optimize their objective function when deciding on MAI membership
22Bagwell and Staiger (1999) shows how the dispute settlement procedure of GATT is self-enforcing.
23Ethier (1998) takes the enforcement issue also as exogenous in a theory of regionalism and provides
additional reasons that apply in our case, too.
16given other governments’ actions, ﬁrm expectation formation, and their own policy of rent
extraction after membership choice.
Moreover, I deﬁne a partial MAI equilibrium of this game at a given MAI rule (8)
as an equilibrium where some countries decide to enter MAI and others opt out. Instead,
a complete MAI is an equilibrium where all countries join MAI. I am mainly interested in
t h ea n a l y s i so fp a r t i a lM A I .
Optimal ﬁrm behavior is already discussed in section 2.1 apart from MNEs’ expec-
tation formation. To characterize expectation formation, however, the optimal government
choices have to be analyzed. The countries that opt into MAI choose the optimal rent ex-
traction rate in analogy to the case without MAI in equation (6) by βiI = β (χ,E [βiI |I])
whenever the MAI rule (8) is not binding (β (χ,E [βiI |I]) ≤ B). The case, when the rule
is binding will be discussed in section 2.6. The optimal rent extraction rate choice of a
country i when opting out is given by βiO = β (χ,E [βiO |O]). The expectation on rent
extraction depends on how countries decide to enter MAI or opt out once a particular
MAI exists. This is analyzed in the next section.
2.5 Self-selection of countries
The decision to enter a MAI of given strictness B is made based on the government
objective function under the two alternative choices. First, the government objective
function when entering MAI shall be denoted WiI (χ,βiI) and the objective function when
opting out by WiO (χ,βiO). By the Nash-conjecture, opponent actions are taken as given
and thus φi1Z is exogenous to the MAI membership choice. Under this condition, I ﬁnd a
self-sorting order in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 Ac o u n t r yi will prefer to opt out (in) if χi <χ ∗ (χi >χ ∗), given a thresh-
old value χ∗, χ∗ > 1, such that WiI (χ∗,βiI)=WiO (χ∗,βiO). Formally, WiI (χi,βiI) ≶
WiO (χi,βiO) if and only if χi ≶ χ∗.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
17Intuitively, each country faces a trade-oﬀ. When increasing the rent extraction
rate, the government revenue increases and FDI inﬂows decrease which reduces total factor
income. The larger is the weight χi the smaller is chosen a βiZ to ﬁnd the optimal trade-
oﬀ. When comparing the government objective functions of two countries i and i0 with
marginally diﬀerent lobbying terms χi and χi
0 with χi >χ i
0,t h e ni will choose a marginally
lower rent extraction rate β. Since the β-choice of both countries is optimal for them, the
impact of changing β optimally when changing χ has only a second-order eﬀect on the
objective function by the envelope theorem. The only remaining ﬁrst-order eﬀect is the
direct eﬀect of a change in the valuation χ of capital income. Capital income in MAI is,
however, larger than outside MAI, because rent extraction inside is restricted while it is
not outside. Hence, MNEs expect lower rent extraction from members, and devote more
FDI there which causes a country to have a higher rental rate when inside MAI than
when outside. Finally, the larger rental income beneﬁts more those countries with larger
valuation of capital income. Hence, MAI membership is the more desired the larger is the
valuation term χ.
I can show that this mechanism holds for general functional forms and diﬀerent
ways of modelling FDI as long as MAI consists of a maximum rent extraction rule for
members, and is credible. Yet, this self-sorting order will be a crucial mechanics for this
model.
2.6 Forming expectations on rent extraction
When deciding in period 1 on the MNE location, ﬁr m so b s e r v et h ed e c i s i o no fc o u n t r i e st o
join MAI or opt out. Hence, they form expectations on the rent extraction rate conditional
on this information.
Before I can form expectations, I need to characterize how countries i determine
their rent extraction rate and membership decision in the presence of a MAI rule (8) when








≡ B, and obtain the next Lemma.
Lemma 3 (i) There is a group of countries i with χ∗ <χ i <
˜
χ such that these coun-
18tries enter MAI, although the MAI rule (8) is binding if a χ∗,χ ∗ > 1, exists such that
WiI (χ∗,βiI)=WiO (χ∗,βiO).
(ii) For a country i∗ with a corresponding χi∗ = χ∗, χ∗ > 1, such that WiI (χ∗,βiI)=
WiO (χ∗,βiO),t h e r em u s tb eβ (χ∗,E[βiO |O]) >B .
Proof: See Appendix 3.
Summing up the insights on the optimal rent extraction rate from Lemmas 2 and
3, I can describe the country choice of the rent extraction rate βiM in a world with MAI
under the assumption that country i∗ with lobbying parameter χi∗ = χ∗ is indiﬀerent of
its choice to join MAI or opt out as:
βiM =

      
      
β (χi,E[βiO |O]) if χi ≤ χ∗
B if χ∗ ≤ χi <
˜
χ
β (χi,E[βiI |O]) if
˜




where χIu = u(2 − E [βiI |I]). First of all, we observe that βiM does neither depend on
world income Y nor on any country factor endowments. Moreover, it is only through χi
depending on i. It is straight forward to see that
∂βM (χ)
∂χ
≤ 0 for χ 6= χ
∗ (10)
analogous to Lemma 1. The larger is the weight of the government objective function
on capital income the less inclined is this government to extract rents from foreign ﬁrms,
reduce the FDI inﬂows, and suﬀer from lower capital income.
I assume that there exists a country i∗ with a corresponding χi∗ = χ∗ such that this
country is indiﬀerent of entering MAI or opting out. Then, the conditional expectation of






where I apply Lemma 2, the assumption on a uniform distribution of the lobbying term
χ, and equation (9). Fortunately, a closed form solution can be obtained for the expected
value E [βiO |O] which is given in Appendix 4. It depends only on one endogenous variable
- the partition of countries χ∗ - and must be falling in it, because the expansion of χ∗ leads
to an addition of countries outside MAI with a rent extraction rate lower than the average
among outsiders.
The expected value of the rent extraction rate inside MAI is a bit more complicated












χ − χ∗ . (12)
Also in this case, I can obtain a closed form solution which is given again in Appendix
4. Accordingly, the expected value E [βiI |I] depends only on the endogenous variable χ∗,
and falls in it for the same reason as before.
Finally, I obtain the optimal choice of the rent extraction rate when the indiﬀerent
country i∗ is opting out:
βi∗O =1− u
E [βiO |O]
2u − χ∗ ≡ βO (χ
∗). (13)
Also this rent extraction rate depends only on one endogenous variable, χ∗.C o n c e r n i n g
the exogenous variables, the expected values of the rent extraction rates depend on the
marginal utility of public goods u, the strictness of MAI B, and the distribution parameter
_
χ. They do not depend on world income or factor endowments.
From equations (9), (10), (11) and (12), I can infer the following order of rent
extraction rates
E [βiI |I] ≤ B<β O (χ
∗) ≤ E [βiO |O] (14)
20B
χ ~





Figure 2: Optimal rent extraction rate choice
expected by MNEs for all possible interior values of χ∗.
Finally, I ﬁnd from the period 1 analogue to (3), and (14) that
φi1I >φ i1N >φ i1O (15)
for all possible interior values of χ∗. Inequality (15) expresses an investment diversion
channel in the model. Since countries that join MAI are self-selected to be the ones that
extract the least rents from MNEs, MAI membership reveals information to the MNEs
and increases FDI inﬂows relative to both a world without MAI and to a situation when a
country opts out. Likewise, when opting out, there is a signal of bad quality to MNEs, and
FDI inﬂows are lower both relative to a situation when joining MAI or when there does
not exist a MAI. Equation (9) reveals then that MAI countries get an extra incentive to
extract rents, since a larger rent-extraction base enlarges the time-inconsistency problem.
Conversely, outsiders have a reduced incentive to extract rents, since the rent-extraction
base is diminished and the time-inconsistency problem reduced.
I can summarize the discussion in this section by drawing a graph of the chosen
rent extraction rate in dependence of the underlying lobbying parameter χi (formalized
21in equation (9)). The thick line in Figure 2 describes the rent extraction rate in a world
with partial MAI. If a country with lobbying parameter χ∗ exists that is indiﬀerent to
join, then a jump occurs which is derived in Lemma 3. Since, when opting out of MAI,
FDI inﬂows are reduced due to the disadvantageous signal of non-membership, the rent
extraction rate must be substantially higher than the maximum standard to compensate
with higher revenues both for the loss in capital income and the reduction in the rent
extraction base. The thin line, instead, depicts the rent extraction rate that would have
prevailed in a world without MAI (formalized in equation (6)).
2.7 Characterizing equilibrium for a given MAI
Next, I characterize whether a partial MAI exists. A country i is indiﬀerent on the MAI














where w(x,y,χ) ≡ 0.25χ(1 − x)
2 +0 .5u(1 − x)y. The function w(x,y,χ) is the govern-
ment objective value in a regime and a year of a country with a lobbying parameter, χ, a
government choice of the rent extraction rate, y, and a given expectation of MNEs on the
rent extraction rate, x. Interestingly, when expectations are correct (x = y), the function
has a peak in x for a given χ at (u − χ)/(2u − χ).O n l yi fu>1, the peak will be in the
positive range and the desired rent extraction rate is positive. Otherwise, a rent extrac-
tion rate of zero is optimal for any indiﬀerent country i∗.I fχ =1 , the function w(x,y,χ)
captures country welfare in a period.
Equation (16) is an implicit function of one endogenous variable χ∗, because E [βiO |O],
and E [βiI |I] depend according to (11) and (12) on no other endogenous variable but χ∗.
22All other endogenous variables of the subgame can be solved for, once a χ∗ exists and is
known.
Importantly, the indiﬀerence condition is homogeneous of degree zero in both world
income and country factor endowments. Hence, the indiﬀerence function
˜
W (χ∗) does not
depend on a country index i. Henceforth, the country index i can be dropped and country
diﬀerences are fully accounted for by keeping track of χ. T h i sp r o p e r t yh i n g e so nt h e
assumption of a Cobb-Douglas functional form of the ﬁxed cost component of MNEs. Only
the strictness of the MAI participation rule, B, the distortion from the underprovision of
public goods, u, and properties of the distribution function of the pressure group distortion
term,
_
χ, matter for the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where all countries with χi >




















Proof: See appendix 5.
Since the condition (17) in Proposition 1 is a bit hard to understand economically,
I provide two corollaries with simple intuitions.
Corollary 1: (i) If u =1, then the only equilibrium is one where all countries
join MAI.
Proof: See Appendix 6.
Corollary 1 has a simple economic meaning. If there is no underprovision of public
goods (u =1 ), then the only Pareto-optimal allocation of factors is the one without
government intervention. The only two distortions in the economy left are the time-
inconsistency problem and the lobbying distortion. The time inconsistency problem is
fully solved by the MAI rule, and the lobbying distortion is towards zero, i.e. the free
23market solution. Hence, all countries decide to join MAI and the MAI preferred by all
countries is the strictest one possible, i.e. B =0 . Since there were LDCs objecting to
MAI negotiations, the scenario without underprovision of public goods does not ﬁtt h i s
empirical observation and I continue to analyze the case u>1.
Another benchmark on the condition (17) is found with respect to the strictness of






and characterize a MAI when such a benchmark happens to be negotiated.
Corollary 2: If B = B∗, then the only equilibrium is one where all countries join
MAI.
Proof: See appendix 7.
The intuition of Corollary 2 is also straight forward. The benchmark B∗ is the
value of the rent extraction rate that is chosen by a social planner in a world without
information asymmetries. Since the lobbying distortion pushes the desired rent extraction
rate below B∗, the time inconsistency distortion alone causes a rent extraction rate above
B∗. However, MAI rule B∗ provides to all countries a commitment device to solve the
time-inconsistency problem by joining MAI at no cost. Hence, opting out of MAI makes
no longer sense. Overall, a weak MAI (large B) is not sharply binding and every country
joins MAI to avoid losses from signalling high rent-extraction rates in case of staying out.
Next, I compare the incentives of governments to protest against MAI negotiations.
Every government objects negotiation if ite x p e c t sal o s si naw o r l dw i t hM A Ic o m p a r e d
to one without.
Proposition 2 Governments of all countries that do not join MAI lose compared to a
world without MAI; governments of all countries with χi >
˜
χ gain. At least some govern-
ments of countries that join MAI with χi such that χ∗ >χ i >
˜
χ lose.
Proof: See appendix 8.
24This proposition can explain why some countries object other countries to negoti-
ate a MAI even though they are neither forced into nor excluded from membership. A
partial MAI, i.e. a MAI where some countries join and others opt out, exerts a negative
information externality on non-members; outsiders signal that they are inclined to extract
large rents from MNEs. The resulting investment diversion harms governments that do
not decide to join. It need to be kept in mind, however, that a loss for a government
does not necessarily imply a welfare loss of the country, since government objectives are
distorted by lobbying groups.24
Proposition 2 can explain the protest storm of some LDCs against the negotiation
of MAI by the club of the OECD countries, although they were both free to opt in or
out. According to my explanation, they were fearing the information externality that may
arise from the decision to opt out. The protest comes from governments that are ex post
but not ex ante contra free-market spirited. Again, a quote by the former Commerce
Secretary to Government of India supports this model feature: "Selective and judicious
government intervention is therefore widely considered necessary to support or protect
domestic industry and technology creation ... Adequate freedom and ﬂexibility to pursue
their own policies towards FDI and foreign technology is therefore regarded by developing
countries as a matter of fundamental importance ..." (Ganesan, 1998, p. 5)
3 Endogenous MAI Formation
I extend now the game by two additional stages to endogenize which countries start ne-
gotiating agreements among themselves. I superimpose on top of the previous stages the
choice of countries with which other countries to start negotiation and the choice of each
negotiation group of how strict the MAI rule is going to be. The new timing is given in
Figure 3.
24The result in proposition 2 mirrors the one in Turrini and Urban (2001). However, I derive the result
analytically in a world of partial MAI while the previous study derived this result for a complete MAI.
25Government 
decides to join 
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Figure 3: Sequencing of events in section 3
3.1 Negotiating MAI
In this section, I turn to the stage when MAI is negotiated. I assume that there exists a club
C of a countable number of countries that starts exclusively negotiating an agreement.25
In particular, this group chooses the threshold B. The club is assumed to have more
favorable political-risk characteristics than the world as a whole.
All countries are then free to opt in or out after the agreement is written. I assume
also that MAI takes the form of a rule β ≤ B. Then the strictness of MAI, i.e. the
threshold value B, can be found from a simple Nash bargaining solution where the Nash
product is deﬁned as
Q
c∈C
[WcI (χc,βiM,B) − WcN (χc,βiM)]
1
|C| , (19)
|C| is the number of group members, and the government objective function of successful
negotiation WcI (χc,βiM,B) obtains an additional argument B, since the strictness of
MAI is now allowed to vary. In addition applies the participation constraint due to the
assumption of unanimity among negotiators
[WcI (χc,βiM,B) − WcN (χc,βiM)] ≥ 0 (20)
for all countries c ∈ C. I denote with χs the country with the smallest weight on capital
25By the chosen set-up, Northern home country interests are consistently excluded from shaping the
agreement, because MNE proﬁts are zero in any case. Any Northern home country will thus have interests
similar to host countries. This feature clearly falls short of reality. Section 5 argues, however, why this
particular model feature does not upset the model mechanics.
26income in the negotiation group C, i.e. χs =m i n
c∈C
{χc}. Likewise, I denote the country
with the largest weight χl,i . e .χl =m a x
c∈C
{χc}. Then the constraint (20) is not binding for
any country unless it is binding for country χs, since χs is the country that is ﬁrst hit by
a welfare loss according to Proposition 2 when the agreement gets too strict.
When maximizing the Nash product (19) with respect to MAI strictness B under






WcI (χc,βiM,B) − WcN (χc,βiM)
=0 . (21)
The negotiated strictness of the agreement is a weighted average over the individually
optimal choices given by the ﬁrst oder condition
∂WcI(χc,βiM,B)
∂B =0the solution of which is
denoted by B (c).T h eﬁrst order condition (21) implies that the participation constraint
(20) is never binding. As soon as B gets too strict for country χs it obtains an inﬁnite
weighting factor on its own ﬁrst-order condition which ensures that B does not deviate
t o om u c hf r o mi t so w np r e f e r r e dc h o i c e . H e n c e ,t h e r em u s ta l w a y se x i s tas o l u t i o nt o
the ﬁrst order condition (21) such that the negotiated strictness B is between the one
desired by the club member with the largest weight and the one with the lowest weight,
i.e. B (l) <B<B (s). Finally, B is unique, because the function WcI (χc,βiM,B) is
single-peaked.
I collect the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique mapping of a club with a member set C and an
agreement threshold B, B = B (C). The strictness of this agreement is strictly bounded
by the minimum and maximum of the individually optimal choices, i.e. B (l) <B(C) <
B (s).
Proposition 3 is useful to characterize the equilibrium of the entire game.
3.2 Prevalence of Bilateral Investment Agreements
I turn now to the ﬁrst stage of the game when many diﬀerent groups can potentially
negotiate agreements. I assume that any country can negotiate and join any number of
27agreements. Credibility of an agreement requires at least one partner country ("natural
contract enforcer", Ethier, 1998) from the North, although the North continues to stay
outside the model. While there is no endogenous choice by Northern countries, it is
plausible that they have an interest in protecting their MNEs by the strictest agreeable FDI
rules applied to potential host countries. Hence, there is a Northern supply of commitment
devices to any Southern host-country demand for it at the desired degree of strictness. If
a host country joins several agreements, then the rules of the strictest agreement apply
to all MNEs located in a host country.26 Moreover, each host country can be analyzed in
isolation by construction of the model. Hence, the previous analysis of MAI in section 2
carries over to the extension when many agreements can be negotiated by many diﬀerent
groups of countries, since only the strictest agreement to which a host country subscribes
is economically relevant under these assumptions. Finally, we assume marginal costs to
negotiate an agreement.
It turns out that the negotiation result of an exogenously given heterogeneous group
is not yielding a stable outcome. Not only is there protest against an agreement from some
outsiders that obviously lose from the negotiation according to Proposition 2. There is
also a disinterest of some countries within the negotiation group that ﬁnd the negotiated
contract too weak. This incentive leads to the next proposition.
Proposition 4 (i) To any negotiation group of countries C that is heterogeneous in the
lobbying parameter χ, there exists a strict sub-group of C that prefers a MAI negotiated
within the sub-group.
(ii) If there is Northern supply of commitment technology to form an investment agreement
at any degree of strictness, then the only perfect Bayesian equilibrium is one where each
country negotiates agreements together with countries of the same type χ.
26A host country attracts MNEs of those Northern home countries that are granted the best protection
under its strictest agreement. One can think of MNEs engaging into "treaty shopping" by setting up
holding companies in the home country that obtains preferential treatment by the host country of its
foreign aﬃliate. See Weichenrieder (2006) for empirical evidence by investigating ownership chains.
28(iii) The negotiation outcome will be







Proof: See appendix 9.
The intuition behind this proposition is simple. Consider again the country with the
largest lobbying term χl in the negotiation group C. By forming a MAI which is stricter
than the average over all members, this country can reveal more information on its type
and thereby attract additional FDI without constraining its rent extraction rate choice,
since country χl’s optimal choice of the constraint B is a strictly lower value than the one
negotiated by the large group. Hence, the most liberal country of a group has always an
incentive to form a sub-group and to negotiate a stricter MAI. If every government does
that, then there will result a world where there is an investment agreement for each type
χ (BIT regime).
This theoretical result matches quite well with two empirical observations: First,
after the group of negotiating countries was enlarged to include 8 LDCs on top of the
OECD member countries to alleviate the protest storm of LDCs and NGOs, the latest
versions of the agreement appeared full of exemptions of FDI liberalization, while the
ﬁrst versions were attempting a very general liberalization of FDI. When this contract
suggestion was so weak that it was no longer binding for most countries, the main FDI
source countries lost interest in it.27
Second, while a multilateral agreement failed in 1998, there was a spread of BITs
at varying strictness throughout the 90ies. The number of BITs quadrupled during the
90ies to well above 1600 in the year 199828.
While the BIT regime is the one that is preferred by any government, it is not
world-welfare maximizing, since government objectives are distorted by lobbying. I turn
next to a MAI that is world-welfare superior compared to a BIT regime.
27This reasoning for the failure of MAI is found in Hoekman and Saggi (2000, p. 185): "In the end,
OECD countries were only able to agree on a package that was less far-reaching than what is often found in
the bilateral investment agreements between high-income and developing countries ..., reducing the interest
of the business community to push for the agreement."
28See UNCTAD (1998), ﬁgure III.3, p. 83.
294 A World-Welfare-Superior MAI-Design
In this section, I suggest a MAI design that is welfare-superior compared to a regime of
BITs, although I do not provide an optimal mechanism. Such a world-welfare-superior
agreement can be designed as follows.






for all members, and bilateral agreements outside this arrangement do not exist, then this
arrangement is strictly world—welfare superior compared to a regime with BITs.
Proof: See appendix 10.
Again there is a simple intuition behind this result. First note that all countries
join MAI under rule (23), as was found in Corollary 2. Then, the chosen rent extraction
rate of any country i if strictly positive is











which is between the one that maximizes the government-objective function, i.e.
u−χi
2u−χi,
and the one that maximizes the country-welfare function, i.e. B∗,i np e r i o d2 . O n e
qualiﬁcation is necessary for period 1, because then the expected rent-extraction rate
is not equal to the actual one. In fact, MNEs are too pessimistic about their business
opportunities in countries with low rent extraction and too optimistic in countries with
large rent extraction. However, this eﬀect averages out when calculating world-welfare.
All together, there must be a world-welfare gain from such an arrangement, since the
country-welfare function is single-peaked.
The design exploits two eﬀects: ﬁrst the BIT regime is one that solves completely
the time-inconsistency problem but biases the rent extraction rate downward through lob-
bying of capital owners. A MAI rule such as (23) does not rule out the time-inconsistency
bias. On the contrary, it exploits this bias to rise the voluntarily chosen rent extraction
30rate in the direction of the world-welfare optimal one. At the same time, the cap at
B∗ ensures that the time-inconsistency bias is not too strong to rise the rent extraction
rate beyond what is world-welfare optimal. Moreover, the MAI rule (23) ensures that all
countries indeed voluntarily join MAI (Corollary 2) such that the cap applies indeed to all
countries and prevents thus a time-inconsistency bias that is too strong for some countries.
Two remarks on Proposition 5 follow. First of all, the appeal of MAI design (23)
is its property to alleviate a national political-economy distortion without touching on
the sovereignty of this country. The ﬁrst best choice of a government whose preferences
are distorted relative to world welfare is to ﬁnd a partner that guarantees its desired
policy. This strategy is only available, however, if some other country with a commitment
technology is willing to co-operate. Once this is not the case, such a government enters
voluntarily a MAI agreement with design (23) and its own time-inconsistency problem
drives its policy in the direction of the world-welfare optimal choice.
Second, there may still be some countries that lose compared to a BIT regime,
although the MAI design (23) is world-welfare superior. To see why, note that the MAI
rule does not completely resolve the information asymmetry. Countries that choose low
rent extraction indirectly subsidize countries that extract more rents, because MNEs have
positive ex-post proﬁts in the ﬁrst group and negative ones in the second. The ﬁrst group
of countries can avoid the subsidy by entering the BIT regime where all informational
asymmetries are resolved and country welfarei si m p r o v e da tt h ee x p e n s eo fw o r l dw e l f a r e .
Taking this argument at face value, there is a reason for a "grand bargain"29, i.e. the
possibility to use investment liberalization as a bargaining chip in exchange for other
trade issues to create side-payment instruments and compensate losers by winners.
5M o d e l D i s c u s s i o n
In this section I discuss the robustness of my results. I address in turn the FDI model,
the political equilibrium within host countries, and the way MAI is implemented into the
model.
29Hoekman and Saggi (2000) argue for such a "grand bargain".
315.1 Robustness of FDI model
The FDI model is clearly rudimentary and should be best thought of as a reduced form.
Crucial for the model is that FDI inﬂows change relative factor incomes and that factor
income as a whole increases through FDI inﬂows. As pointed out, this hinges crucially
on viewing FDI as ﬂow of technology rather than of physical capital. It also hinges on
a pure theory of vertical FDI. Markusen (2002) has shown in a model of horizontal and
vertical FDI that investment liberalization may indeed be welfare-deteriorating at certain
factor endowment combinations. Apart from these restrictions, the FDI model generalizes
to general functional forms, as well as diﬀerent sector settings. More seriously, I have
ignored MNE proﬁts that are arguably at the heart of highly-developed-country interests
in fostering a MAI.30
5.2 Robustness of political equilibrium
I have described a rather speciﬁc political equilibrium. The lobbying distortion arises
exclusively from capital owners. However, trade unions may also exert lobbying power.
Moreover, I have ignored monopoly rents of local ﬁrms that may be destroyed by FDI
inﬂows thus turning local-ﬁrm owners against FDI liberalization. Last but not least,
governments may have a genuine interest in maximizing government revenue at the expense
of country welfare.
As a result of all those political distortions in government decision making, there
will be a policy that biases rent extraction upward. Hence, there will always be a group
o fc o u n t r i e st h a td o e sn o tj o i nM A Ii ft h i su p w a r db i a si ss u ﬃciently strong. Clearly,
outsider governments of MAI still lose and there is a strong incentive of governments
that wish to extract the least rents from MNEs to form bilateral agreements and signal
their type. Finally, the suggested MAI rule B∗ is world-welfare superior, since the rent-
extraction rate will be above B∗ even when resolving the time-inconsistency problem in a
BIT regime. Hence, those countries that enter MAI are just kept at the country-welfare
30There is a discussion of the implications of an asymmetric distribution of outward FDI in the presence
of MNE monopoly rents in Turrini and Urban (2001).
32optimum B∗ and those countries that opt out, face investment diversion that erodes their
rent-extraction-rate base and induces them to choose less rent extraction. However, then
the political-economy distortion is alleviated even among countries that do not join MAI.
5.3 Robustness of MAI rule
Next, I address informally the question why a common maximum standard may be the
rule that is agreed upon by a club. There are four reasons for using such a rule. First, a
club may try to shift a maximum of welfare from non-members to club members. If the
club members are not constrained by the rule, it is very suitable to exert an asymmetric
impact on countries.
Second, such a rule is easier to agree to than - say - an equality constraint. After
all, all countries that negotiate MAI will be able to choose their optimal policy without
any constraints once they accept that one country cannot inﬂuence the average perception
of MNEs on all future members. In particular, this is the case if there are many countries
p a r to ft h ec l u bt h a tn e g o t i a t e st h ea g r e e m e n t . T h e n ,t h e r ei sn oh o p ef o ra n ys i n g l e
country to shape the agreement in its own interest alone.
Third, Turrini and Urban (2001) show that the actual shape of how MAI mem-
bership reduces the rent extraction capabilities of host countries may vary substantially
and yet produce very similar outcomes. It is only important that some countries have a
relative advantage above others. However, any negotiation of a club is likely to yield such
an outcome in one way or another.
Finally, I have demonstrated that an inequality rule with a particular cap value is
world welfare superior. Taking such a rule as a starting point but manipulating it in the
negotiators’ interest during the negotiation is easier to obscure from the electorate.
6 Concluding Remarks
I have addressed in this study the puzzle why the multilateral investment agreement
(MAI) negotiated by the OECD in 1998 was objected by many less developed countries,
33and eventually failed while at the same time bilateral investment agreements spread out.
My explanation rests on a model where there are three distortions. First, there is a
time-inconsistency problem that inclines governments to extract too much rents from
FDI. Second, there is an underprovision of public goods which renders at least some rent
extraction desirable to ﬁnance the provision of public goods. Third, there is a lobbying
distortion in the political system by capital owners who favor FDI inﬂows. Moreover, the
lobbying distortion is hidden information to foreign investors giving rise to political risk.
MAI is a device to pre-commit to a certain policy of rent extraction if a group of countries
agrees on it.
Any arbitrary club of countries has an incentive to distinguish from countries with
larger propensity to rent extraction to redirect FDI towards themselves. This exerts a
negative information externality on outsiders and can explain the protest of some LDCs
against MAI negotiation. At the same time, there is a genuine interest of some club
members to deviate and form an even stricter agreement among like-minded countries.
A system of bilateral investment agreements emerges that reveals government types to
MNEs. While this solves the informational distortion in the economy, the political economy
distortion remains present. If a MAI design is implemented that excludes bilateral treaties
and sets a cap of the rent extraction rate at the welfare-optimal level, then this alleviates
the political economy distortion and increases world welfare, because a MAI retains a
modest time-inconsistency bias that induces governments to deviate from their own ﬁrst-
best policy in the direction of the ﬁrst-best policy for the country. Yet, all countries join
voluntarily once these two rules are implemented in the world trading system.
34A Appendix
A.1 Appendix 1. Proof of Lemma 1.







≡ χNu >u , (25)
where the inequality follows, since φr1N is strictly positive by the period 1 analogue of (3).
Note, second, that 0 ≤ βiN ≤ 1 by deﬁnition of an extraction rate with strict
inequality for some i. Then, I have


























where the inequality follows from (26). (27) and (28) imply βiN < 1 for all i.¤
A.2 Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 2.
First, all countries i with a βiI ≤ B join MAI, since they are not constrained by the rule,
but can gain additional FDI inﬂows by revealing information on their type being liberal to
FDI. Next, only countries i with βiO >Bdo not join MAI. Otherwise, they would signal
to be of bad quality without exploiting the possibility of violating the MAI rule. This
35implies also that E [βiO |O] >B>E[βiI |I]. But then follows from the period 1 analogue
of (4) for any country i that
ri1I >r i1O (29)
and
r(βiO) <r(B). (30)
Diﬀerentiating the country indiﬀerence condition for any i and given φi1Z yields
∂ [WiI (χ,βiI) − WiO (χ,βiO)]
∂χ
=[ ri1I + r(B) − r(βiO) − ri1O]Ki > 0, (31)





The inequality (31) and equation (32) together imply the Lemma 2. ¤
A.3 Appendix 3. Closed Form Solutions of Expected Rent Ex-
traction Rates.
When plugging (6) into equation (11) and developing the integral I obtain a convenient















χ − χ∗ − uln(1 − B)
. (34)
36A.4 Appendix 4. Proof of Lemma 3.


























Then, the optimal choice of βiM in a world with MAI is given analogously to (6) by
βiM =

   












χ<χ i <χ Iu
0 else
(36)
where χIu is given by
χIu ≡ u[2 − E [βiI |I]].
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ε + uβY φ˜
ε1O + uβY φ(β)
i
, (40)











assumption (35). Hence, there must exist countries i such that χ∗ <χ i <
˜
χ.





By Lemma 2, the equations analoguos to (3) and (4) in period 1, and equation (41), I
infer that φi∗1I >φ i∗1O and r(i∗,1,I) >r(i∗,1,O). But then follows under consideration
of (5) that
W (i
∗,I) − W (i
∗,O)=B [φi∗1I − φi∗1O]Y + ri∗1I − ri∗1O > 0, (42)
which contradicts (41). Since by (i), βi∗O is constrained, it cannot be smaller than B.
Hence, (ii) follows. ¤
A.5 Appendix 5. Proof of Proposition 1.
Condition (17) is equivalent to
˜
W (1) > 0. (43)
Next, I ﬁnd from the period 1 analogue to (3), and equations (9) and (15) that
βiI >β iO (44)
for all possible interior values of χ∗. I conclude from (10) and (44) in turn that there must
exist a χ∗ = χ0 with χ0 <
˜
χ such that
βiO = B (45)




0) − w(E [βiI |I],B,χ
0) (46)
= χ
0 [ri1O − ri1I]Ki
+u · B · Y · [φi1O − φi1I]
< 0,
38where the inequality follows from (1) and (15). Also
˜
W (χ∗) < 0 for χ∗ >χ 0. Hence,
˜
W (χ∗)=0c a no n l yh a v ea ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o ni f1 <χ ∗ <χ 0. Additionally, the function
˜
W (χ∗) is continuous in the relevant range. Then applies together with (43) and (46) the
intermediate value theorem.
Having proven the existence of some interior value of χ∗, the Nash conditions can be
easily assembled. Countries χi have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy
to opt in if and only if χi ≤ χ∗ by Lemma 2. Firms have no incentive to deviate from
their location decision.31 Expectation formation in (33) and (34) is consistent with Bayes’
rule. To see this, note that the prior belief to be type χi is 1/(
_
χ − 1), the conditional
probability to observe policy I is 1 if χi >χ ∗ and 0 else. The unconditional probability of




χ − 1). Hence, the posterior probability to be type χi, after policy I
is observed, is 1/(
_
χ − χ∗) for χi >χ ∗ and 0 else. Likewise, the posterior belief of type χi,
after policy O is observed, is 1/(χ∗ − 1) for χi <χ ∗ and zero else. However, expectation
formation in (33) and (34) uses exactly these posterior probabilities. Finally, countries
have no incentive to deviate from their optimal rent extraction rate choice by construction
of the maximization problem and Lemma 3 given expectation formation.¤
A.6 Appendix 6. Proof of Corollary 1.
The function w(h,h,χ) is quadratic in h and has its peak at h =( u − χ)/(2u − χ). If
u =1 , then the peak is in the negative range that is economically irrelevant and I have
from (14) the inequality
h<B<β i∗O. (47)




31To be formally precise, MNEs randomize with probability φιt t h e i rc h o i c et ol o c a t ei nc o u n t r yi .A t
the equilibrium value of φit, expected proﬁts are zero when locating in country i, but also when not
locating there. By proposition 8.D.1 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995) this suﬃces for a mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium of the location subgame in period t. By the law of large numbers there will be exactly φit





o v e rt h ee n t i r er a n g e0 ≤ h,x,y ≤ 1 and for any χ = 1. From (9), (11), and (12) follows






E [βiO |O] ≥ βi∗O >B≥ E [βiI |I] (51)





















<w (E [βiI |I],B,χ
∗)+w(B,B,χ
∗)




= w(E [βiO |O],βi∗O,χ
∗)+w(βi∗O,βi∗O,χ
∗) − w(E [βiI |I],B,χ
∗) − w(B,B,χ
∗) < 0
40for any χ∗ which contradicts (50). ¤
A.7 Appendix 7. Proof of Corollary 2.
Suppose there exists a partial MAI. Then, must hold
˜
W (1) > 0. (57)
Since from (14), in particular E [βiO |O] ≥ βiO, Ih a v et h a t
w(βiO,βiO,1) ≥ w(E [βiO |O],βiO,1). (58)
Analogously, from (14), in particular B∗ ≥ E [βiI |I], Ih a v et h a t
w(B
∗,B
∗,1) ≥ w(E [βiI |I],B
∗,1). (59)










However, (58), (59), and (61) lead to the inequality
˜
W (1) = w(βiO,βiO,1) + w(E [βiO |O],βiO,1) (62)
−w(B
∗,B
∗,1) − w(E [βiI |I],B
∗,1)
< 0,
which contradicts (57). Hence, there cannot exist a partial MAI, where some countries
opt in and others out. Since some countries always join MAI and partial MAI does not
exist, all countries must join MAI. ¤
41A.8 Appendix 8. Proof of Proposition 2.












































χ>χ ∗. The equation that corresponds to (3) in period 1, and equations (64), (65),
and (66) imply in turn that
φi1N >φ i1O. (67)
Next, the government objective function can be written in the two regimes of a world
















where I note that the function W (i,β,φ) applies in both regimes albeit with diﬀerent





Next, I infer from equations and inequalities (67)-(70) that
W (i,O) <W(i,N) (71)
for every country i with χi <χ ∗, when a partial MAI exists with indiﬀerent country χ∗.
Similarly, I ﬁnd
φi1N <φ i1I (72)
and eventually
W (i,I) >W(i,N) (73)
for all countries i with
˜
χ ≤ χi ≤
_
χ.
Finally, I argue why some countries i with χ∗ ≤ χi ≤
˜
χ must lose in a world with
MAI relative to a world without MAI. The country i with χi = χ∗ is indiﬀerent of joining
MAI but when it does not join MAI it unambiguously loses according to (71). Hence, it
must also lose from a world of MAI when entering MAI.¤
A.9 Appendix 9. Proof of Proposition 3.
P r o o fo fp a r t( i ) : C o n s i d e rc o u n t r i e sc that form a subgroup of all countries C that
negotiate a MAI in a club such that 1 <χ c ≤ χl ≤
_
χ for c ∈ C a n dat h r e s h o l dv a l u eχl.
43Then, countries c have a government objective value W (c,C) conditional on the group C
negotiating an agreement B (C) that can be written as follows:
W (c,C)=m a x
β
[w(E [βcI |B (C) ,I],β,χ c)+w(β,β,χc)]. (74)
where E [βcI |B (C) ,I] denotes the conditional expected value of the rent extraction rate β
when knowing the strictness of MAI B (C) and that the country c is MAI member. Then,






[w(E [βc0I |B (c
0) ,I],β,χ c0)+w(β,β,χ(c
0))] (75)
where E [βc0I |B (c0) ,I]=β. By construction must hold
E [βc0I |B (c
0) ,I] <E[βcI |B (C) ,I]. (76)
Call
a
β the rent extraction rate that maximizes W (c,C),i . e .
a
β =a r gm a x[ w(E [βcI |B (C) ,I],β,χ c)+w(β,β,χc)]. (77)





































Hence, there is an incentive for a subgroup of C to deviate from the commonly negotiated
contract.
Proof of part (iii): consider a BIT of countries c with χc = χ.T h e nP r o p o s i t i o n3
44and equation (21) yield a negotiated strictness of MAI of B (χ)=( u − χ)/(2u − χ).
Proof of part (ii): From part (i) follows that there exists an incentive of some sub-
group to deviate from any MAI that is negotiated by a group of countries C heterogeneous
in χ. Consider the following algorithm: of any possible group C the countries c0 with
χc0 = χl, form an own MAI. Applying this step to all possible groups C yields a system
of investment treaties for each diﬀerent value of χ. There is no incentive to deviate from
such a system, since B (χ) is the rent extraction rate that maximizes the government ob-
jective function of all countries c with lobbying term χc = χ. The assumption on marginal
negotiation costs rules out that a country is member of several agreements given that only
the strictes agreement is economically relevant. ¤
A.10 Appendix 10. Proof of Proposition 5.
Call U (i|A) country i welfare at the MAI regime under rule B∗ and U (i|B) the country
welfare under the BIT regime, respectively. By Corollary 2, all countries i join MAI under
rule (23). Then, I have












respectively. (i) I recall that dw(x,y,χ)/dx < 0.(ii) The function w(h,h,1) has the
property of single-peakedness with peak h =( u − 1)/(2u − 1) = B∗. From rule (23) and
optimal β choice of a country within MAI follows










≡ β (χ,I). (81)
Hence, I have the ranking
u − χi
2u − χi





≤ E [βiI |I] ≤ B
∗ (83)






















by applying property (ii) of the function w(.) and inequalities (82) and (83). World welfare
in a world with MAI rule B∗, i.e. U(A), and world welfare in a regime of BITs U(B) are
the aggregates of all countries’ welfare conditional on the regimes given in (79) and (80).









































where the ﬁrst equality uses Corollary 2, the second equality follows, since y enters linear
in the function w(x,y,χ) and the law of large numbers is applied, and the inequality
follows from (84) and (85). ¤
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